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襂THE AUTHORS AND CHINA OCEANS LAW REVIEW
Abstract:The purpose of this article is to analyze and propose potential alterna鄄
tives to the stalemate of sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea. The background
and status quo in the region suggest that sovereignty disputes are not likely to be set鄄
tled in the foreseeable future. Although recommended by many diplomats and schol鄄
ars, traditional dispute settlement mechanisms under international law, including dip鄄
lomatic negotiation and third鄄party arbitration, will not likely work in the South China
Sea, at least in the near future. Due to the probable difficulties in implementing ei鄄
ther of the mechanisms, “ joint development冶 of oil and gas reserves and “ regional
cooperation冶 on the marine environment and shared resources have been recommen鄄
ded as alternatives to circumvent these sovereignty disputes. Nevertheless, this article
finds that joint development of oil and gas reserves is similarly unlikely to work in the
near future because it suffers the same weakness as traditional mechanisms, in that
any resolution may have sovereignty implications. On the other hand, cooperation has
been recognized as a necessary and fundamental principle in international law and in鄄
ternational relations. In addition, there are many legal commitments by bordering
States / regions to cooperate on the commons under United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea and many other international environmental conventions. Some coop鄄
erative activities related to the commons are regularly carried out on bilateral or multi鄄
lateral bases in the region. Notwithstanding the lack of progress toward final settle鄄
ment of sovereignty disputes, regional cooperation in the South China Sea may be a
workable alternative for all States concerned in the near future. As always, the politi鄄
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cal will of all parties is paramount to the success of such an endeavor.
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玉. Introduction
Conflicting sovereignty claims over the South China Sea have been made and dis鄄
puted for decades. Six parties, including China Mainland, Vietnam, Malaysia, Bru鄄
nei, the Philippines and China Taiwan, have asserted their sovereignty over all or
part of the region. However, sovereignty disputes among these parties in the South
China Sea have been in a political deadlock, and none “has made any concessions
despite conflicts involving fishing vessels, maritime surveillance boats and oil explo鄄
ration ships. 冶髆 In light of the recent conflict between China and the Philippines over
Huang鄄yan Island in April and May of 2012,髇 the prospect of an effective resolution
of these conflicting claims in the South China Sea is not very promising.
Since the South China Sea has been a flashpoint of sovereignty disputes for
years, many diplomats have tried to resolve the disagreements in the region through
various mechanisms. Likewise, scholars have provided many recommendations
whereby resolutions might be achieved by different approaches. However, as of 2012
none of them has been successfully implemented, nor seems likely to work, at least
in the near future. Therefore, solutions to work around the disputes must be sought
elsewhere.
More importantly, the stalemate of sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea
does not mean that claimants can take no actions. In particular, the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)髈 stipulates that if maritime delimita鄄
tion on concerned States蒺 exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and continental shelves
cannot be reached, they “shall冶 enter into provisional arrangements. 髉 The bordering
States / regions in the South China Sea, except China Taiwan, have all ratified UN鄄
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CLOS. Thus, they “shall冶 have a legal obligation to comply with this requirement.
The purpose of this article is to analyze and propose potential alternatives to the
stalemate of sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea. It begins with an introduc鄄
tion to the status quo of disputes in the region. In the next section follows a discus鄄
sion of mechanisms and resolutions which have been proposed. Thirdly, this article
examines the requirements of provisional arrangements stipulated in UNCLOS. Fourth鄄
ly, it analyzes potential alternatives which would likely work in the South China Sea.
Last, observations and recommendations are presented and discussed.
域. Background and Status Quo of the Disputes
in the South China Sea
摇 摇 The South China Sea has long been labeled as “ troubled waters. 冶髊 It contains
rich living and non鄄living resources, is important geostrategically given that it con鄄
tains crucial Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) connecting the Pacific Ocean and
the Indian Ocean, and is populated by numerous tiny insular features, which can be
generally classified into four groups: the Pratas Islands (Dong鄄sha Archipelagos in
Chinese), the Maccelesfield Bank (Chong鄄sha Archipelagos in Chinese), the Para鄄
cel Islands (Shi鄄sha Archipelagos in Chinese), and the Spratly Islands (Nan鄄sha Ar鄄
chipelagos in Chinese). 髍
Sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea, which generally focus on the many
insular features and on maritime boundary delimitations, make this region a potential
“flashpoint冶 for conflict. Smith once mentioned that disputes involving islands fall
under two major categories: (i) Disputes over the sovereignty of the island(s) itself;
and (ii) Disputes over the effect the island(s) may have on the delimitation of adja鄄
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A. Territorial Sovereignty Disputes
All four groups of islands in the South China Sea are subject to sovereignty dis鄄
putes, but to different degrees and involving different claimants. To a small extent,
claims follow patterns of spacial distribution or “nearest neighbor,冶 though there are
many exceptions. The centrally located Spratly Islands, for instance, are presently
occupied without any noticeable pattern, which would make delimitations around
these islands, if that is part of the final solution, even more challenging. 髏
China Taiwan and China Mainland both claim sovereignty over the Pratas
Islands, which have been under effective control of China Taiwan since the 1950s.
The Maccelesfield Bank is also claimed by both China Taiwan and China Mainland.
However, from the Chinese perspective, the Chong鄄Sha Archipelago includes not on鄄
ly the Maccelesfield Bank but also the Scarborough Reef (or Huang鄄yan Island men鄄
tioned above). Thus from the Chinese perspective, the Philippines must be counted
as a claimant as well because it also has lodged a territorial claim over the Reef. 髐
The territorial sovereignty over the Paracel Islands is disputed by China Taiwan, Chi鄄
na Mainland and Vietnam. China Mainland has effectively controlled them since the
Battle of the Paracel Islands between China Mainland and Vietnam in 1974. The
Spratly Islands, in the central part of the South China Sea, are disputed among six
bordering parties: China Mainland, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines and
China Taiwan.
B. Maritime Jurisdiction Disputes
In addition to territorial sovereignty disputes, bordering States / regions also claim
maritime jurisdiction over all or part of the South China Sea for various reasons. For
instance, China Taiwan, China Mainland and Vietnam claim maritime jurisdiction o鄄
ver the entire South China Sea on historical grounds. The Philippines claim maritime
jurisdiction over the Kalayaan region based on the “right of discovery冶 under interna鄄
tional law. On the other hand, Malaysia and Brunei both claim maritime jurisdiction
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based on UNCLOS, particularly the principle of natural prolongation of continental
shelf. 輥輮
The negotiation, adoption, and entry into force of UNCLOS and its ratification
by all bordering States / regions (except China Taiwan) is the main driver to maritime
jurisdiction disputes in the South China Sea. Before UNCLOS, coastal States rarely
extended their jurisdiction more than three nautical miles ( nm) offshore. As a re鄄
sult, overlaps of maritime jurisdiction were infrequent. However, UNCLOS not only
extends the territorial sea up to 12 nm but also allows coastal States to claim an EEZ
from 12 nm to 200 nm measured from their territorial baselines, and in some in鄄
stance, to claim continental shelf of up to 350 nm. That development significantly in鄄
creased the frequency and severity of one State蒺s jurisdiction claim overlapping
another蒺s. This situation is especially prevalent in a semi鄄enclosed sea like the South
China Sea due to its unique geographic features.
Abundant fishery resources and the possibility of huge oil and gas reserves in鄄
crease the interest of bordering parties to expand their maritime jurisdictions. The e鄄
merging interest of the world蒺s States in developing offshore food and energy resources
to meet the demands of growing populations, particularly as their land鄄based re鄄
sources cannot support increasing needs any longer, makes these jurisdictional dis鄄
putes more urgent. Thus, Smith and Thomas observed that “it is fair to say that ma鄄
rine resource jurisdiction is at least an implicit issue in almost all island disputes,
whether or not openly stated in the publicity surrounding those disputes, and regard鄄
less of when and over what issue the dispute originated. 冶輥輯
C. Sovereignty Claims and Occupation Status in the South China Sea
Although the South China Sea is surrounded by eight bordering parties, not all
of them are currently making any claims to the islands or waters therein. As previous鄄
ly mentioned, the claimants are China Taiwan, China Mainland, Vietnam, Malay鄄
sia, Brunei and the Philippines. Singapore and Indonesia do not claim sovereignty o鄄
ver any of the islands and / or waters within the South China Sea.
China Taiwan bases its territorial and maritime jurisdiction claim to the South
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immemorial. 冶輥輰 In 1946, the ROC Government was the first claimant to make its ter鄄
ritorial claim over all insular features in the South China Sea. It also drew a discon鄄
tinuous U鄄shaped line encompassing close to the coasts of other bordering States / re鄄
gions, and asserted all waters within the U鄄shaped line as “historic waters冶 while it
still ruled China Mainland. In 1947, it officially annexed the four groups of islands
under the administrative jurisdiction of Kuangtung Province. Since then, this claim
has remained unchanged. Currently, China Taiwan effectively controls the Pratas
Islands and two of the Spratly Islands, including the biggest: Tai鄄ping Island. 輥輱
Since its establishment on China Mainland in 1949, P. R. China has assumed
the ROC Government蒺s claim to the South China Sea with a revised, but similar, dis鄄
continuous U鄄shaped line. It eliminated 2 of the original 11 sections of the line in the
Gulf of Tonkin due to the transfer of sovereignty of one island to North Vietnam in the
1950s. 輥輲 Except for this, China Mainland and China Taiwan have maintained the
same claim in the South China Sea disputes for over half a century. 輥輳 China Mainland
currently controls all the Paracel Islands and 11 of the Spratly Islands. 輥輴
Vietnam claims territorial sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands based
on “ historical discovery,冶 visits and administration “ from time immemorial 冶 as
well. 輥輵 Cordner argues, however, that such historical claims should really be limited
to the timeframe during and after French occupation. 輥輶 Recently, Vietnam also asser鄄
ted that the extent of its continental shelf entitles Vietnam to occupy these islands. 輥輷
Although it lost possession over the Paracel Islands in 1974, today it controls over 30
762
Potential Alternatives to the Disputes in the









Alice D. Ba ed., China and the Spratly Islands: Prospects for Joint Development, Virginia: De鄄
partment of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia, August 1993, p. 4.
The website of the Task Force for Marine Affairs, “Executive Yuan,冶 Taiwan, at http: / / www.
cmaa. nat. gov. tw / ch / NewsContent. aspx? NewsID = 130&path = 275, 17 October 2012. ( in
Chinese)
Zou Keyuan, The Chinese Traditional Maritime Boundary Line in the South China Sea and Its
Legal Consequences for the Resolution of the Disputes over the Spratly Islands, The Interna鄄
tional Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, Vol. 14, No. 1, 1999, pp. 34 ~ 35.
Nien鄄Tsu Alfred Hu, South China Sea: Troubled Waters or a Sea of Opportunity?, Ocean De鄄
velopment & International Law, Vol. 41, Issue 3, 2010, p. 207.
The website of the Task Force for Marine Affairs, “Executive Yuan,冶 Taiwan, at http: / / www.
cmaa. nat. gov. tw / ch / NewsContent. aspx? NewsID = 130&path = 275, 17 October 2012. ( in
Chinese)
Mark J. Valencia, Jon M. Van Dyke and Noel A. Ludwig eds., Sharing the Resources of the
South China Sea, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997, p. 30.
Lee G. Cordner, The Spratly Islands Dispute and the Law of the Sea, Ocean Development & In鄄
ternational Law, Vol. 25, Issue 1, 1994, p. 65.
Joshua P. Rowan, The U. S. -Japan Security Alliance, ASEAN, and the South China Sea Dis鄄
pute, Asian Survey, Vol. 45, No. 3, 2005, pp. 424 ~ 425.
China Oceans Law Review (Vol. 2013 No. 1)
of the Spratly Islands, the greatest number among the claimants in this region. 輦輮
Malaysia is one of the two claimants which do not base the territorial sovereignty
and maritime jurisdiction on historic grounds. Rather, Malaysia asserts its sovereignty
over 12 of the Spratly Islands, six of which have been physically occupied by Malay鄄
sia since 1978 in the southern part of the South China Sea. Its claim is based upon
the “natural prolongation冶 of its continental shelf. 輦輯 It likewise claims jurisdiction o鄄
ver its continental shelf in this region based on the relevant provisions in UNCLOS.
Brunei claims two reefs —the Rifleman Bank and the Louisa Reef (the latter is
also claimed by Malaysia)— and a rectangular maritime zone. Like Malaysia, Brunei
bases its claims for the reefs on the prolongation on its continental shelf. 輦輰 In 1988,
Brunei issued a map displaying a continental shelf claim extending beyond the Rifle鄄
man Bank, which appeared to be based upon a 350 nm continental shelf interpreta鄄
tion, or the extension based on the Louisa Reef. 輦輱
The Philippines assert sovereignty over the Scarborough Reef and part of the
Spratly Islands within the Kalayann Islands Group (KIG) based on the fact that these
islets are adjacent or contiguous to the Philippine Islands ( and so subject to the
“proximity principle冶 in international law); that this region is vital to the country蒺s
economic survival and security;輦輲 that these islets were res nullius or abandoned after
Japan蒺s renunciation of all rights, title and claim to the South China Sea islands in the
1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty and thus “were equally open to economic exploita鄄
tion and settlement by nationals or any members of the Allied Powers;冶輦輳 and that re鄄
cent Philippine occupation gives it title either through “discovery or prescriptive ac鄄
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Spratly Islands. 輦輵
D. Summary
From the preceding analysis, current sovereignty disputes in the South China
Sea include territorial disputes over the insular features (particularly the Paracel and
the Spratly Islands) and overlapping maritime jurisdiction claims. For the former, all
claimants have physically occupied some of these insular features except for Brunei.
For the latter, the parties concerned assert their maritime claims based on various le鄄
gal and historical grounds, which further complicates the final settlement of these dis鄄
putes. This, combined with the sheer number of claimants, suggests that sovereignty
disputes in the region can be expected to continue and are not likely to be settled in
the foreseeable future.
芋. Proposed Mechanisms and Resolutions to the Disputes
in the South China Sea
摇 摇 Since the South China Sea disputes have persisted for many decades, diplomats
and scholars, both from the West and from States in the region, have tried to provide
mechanisms and resolutions to settle regional differences. This section intends to pro鄄
vide a general overview of these mechanisms and recommended resolutions by revie鄄
wing related literature.
Diplomatic negotiation is the most common mechanism that States use to settle
disputes under international law, and is particularly common in a bilateral mode. 輦輶
Several scholars have suggested approaches based on this mechanism which could
lead to final settlement of sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea. These approa鄄
ches include the so鄄called “doughnut formula,冶輦輷 whereby the insular features are ig鄄
nored when delimiting maritime zones, and thus the center of the South China Sea re鄄
mains “high seas. 冶 Another suggested approach would give one claimant, be it P.
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R. China or Vietnam, very limited sovereignty over all insular features in the South
China Sea, with others having access for peaceful purposes, including resources de鄄
velopment. 輧輮 A third suggestion is that “ASEAN, given its interests in a peaceful
maritime regime, declares an EEZ on behalf of the whole ASEAN member States in
order to avoid inter鄄ASEAN disputes. 冶輧輯
As mentioned in Section 域, there is no evidence that parties in the region are
willing to make any concessions or compromises to their sovereignty claims. In addi鄄
tion, these three approaches would not likely work if sovereignty claims over islands
in the South China Sea could not be effectively addressed. As a consequence, none
of these approaches have been accepted or implemented by bordering parties since
being recommended. This implies that diplomatic negotiation is an unlikely mecha鄄
nism through which to settle the disputes in the South China Sea, at least in the near
future.
Third鄄party arbitration has been widely discussed as a potential mechanism
through which to settle the disputes in the South China Sea as well. Possible courts or
fora include the International Court of Justice ( ICJ), International Tribunal of the
Law of the Sea ( ITLOS), and the United Nations Security Council. 輧輰 This mecha鄄
nism is particularly favored by western States and many international organizations.
More importantly, international courts and tribunals have evolved numerous and inno鄄
vative ways to address the “ trouble with islands冶 and achieve equitable resolutions,
particularly in the context of maritime boundary delimitations. 輧輱
However, it is highly questionable whether the claimant States in the South Chi鄄
na Sea would be willing to bring their disputes before a court. This is because
“Southeast Asia is known as a region with a tradition of non鄄adjudication,冶輧輲 a pro鄄
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the case involved冶輧輳 and “ the distrust of Western鄄dominated international law. 冶輧輴
There are some encouraging signs to indicate that third鄄party arbitration is gradually
becoming an acceptable option to some bordering States / regions, such as the 1998
Indonesia and Malaysia Case輧輵 and the 2003 Malaysia and Singapore Case輧輶 of ICJ,
along with the fact that the Philippines has expressed its willingness to submit its dis鄄
puted claim ( the Kalayaan area in the South China Sea) to ICJ or other similarly
constituted body for adjudication. 輧輷 Despite these examples, the use of third鄄party ar鄄
bitration remains unlikely to be accepted by most parties in the South China Sea, par鄄
ticularly P. R. China, in the near future. This is because, as highlighted by Thao
and Amer, “the Court has jurisdiction only to resolve legal disputes. However, a res鄄
olution of the disputes (…) involves and must satisfy political, economical and so鄄
cial concerns as well as legal concerns. 冶輨輮
In short, traditional dispute settlement mechanisms under international law,
whether diplomatic negotiation or third鄄party arbitration, will not likely work in the
South China Sea, at least in the near future. Therefore, solutions to work around the
disputes must be sought elsewhere.
郁. Provisional Arrangements in UNCLOS
Despite being called “a constitution for the oceans,冶輨輯 UNCLOS does not con鄄
tain resolutions in any of its articles to settle territorial sovereignty disputes (including
islands). It does, however, provide relevant principles for coastal States to delimit
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their maritime boundaries with other adjacent or opposite States in Articles 15, 74
and 83 for territorial seas, EEZs and continental shelves, respectively. For instance,
States should adopt the “median line冶 principle as their delimitation method in terri鄄
torial seas輨輰 in that all States have equal sovereignty, and such sovereignty extends to
territorial seas. On the other hand, States should achieve an “equitable solution冶 on
the basis of international law for the delimitation of the EEZ and continental shelf,輨輱
but no explicit methods or criteria are provided in these two articles or any other pro鄄
visions. Therefore, delimitation of EEZs and continental shelves between States is
more complicated and difficult than that in territorial seas. Such situations also imply
that reaching a final delimitation in EEZs and continental shelves may be expected to
take more time.
In order to avoid disadvantages due to pending agreements in both EEZs and
continental shelves, UNCLOS stipulates a legal obligation to concerned States in Arti鄄
cles 74(3) and 83(3), both stating:
Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1, the States concerned, in a
spirit of understanding and cooperation, shall make every effort to enter into provi鄄
sional arrangements of a practical nature and, during this transitional period,
not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement. Such arrange鄄
ments shall be without prejudice to the final delimitation.
Nordquist et al considered that this paragraph combines two elements:
the duty to make every effort to conclude provisional arrangements of a practical
nature, and a prohibition against jeopardizing or hampering the reaching of the
final agreement. The first element aims to promote the adoption of certain interim
measures, and the second one seeks to limit the activities of the States concerned in
the disputed area. 輨輲
Nevertheless, one question still arises from these articles as well as from Nordquist蒺s
explanation: on what subjects must States make provisional arrangements?
If delimitations of the EEZ and continental shelf between States cannot be
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their rights and duties in the disputed areas because each will try to prevent the pres鄄
ence of the others in such areas. To understand what kinds of rights and duties coast鄄
al States have in their EEZs and continental shelves, it is necessary to review relevant
provisions in the EEZ and continental shelf regimes under UNCLOS.
Part V of UNCLOS gives coastal States the following rights, jurisdiction and du鄄
ties within their EEZs:
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and
managing the natural resources, whether living or non鄄living, of the waters super鄄
jacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other ac鄄
tivities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the pro鄄
duction of energy from the water, currents and winds;
(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention
with regard to:
( 印) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and struc鄄
tures;
( 英) marine scientific research;
( 樱) the protection and preservation of the marine environment;
(c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention. 輨輳
Part VI of UNCLOS stipulates the rights of coastal States within the continental shelf
as follows:
The coastal State exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose
of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources…,
The natural resources referred to in this Part consist of the mineral and other
non鄄living resources of the seabed and subsoil together with living organisms be鄄
longing to sedentary species, that is to say, organisms which, at the harvestable
stage, either are immobile on or under the seabed or are unable to move except in
constant physical contact with the seabed or the subsoil. 輨輴
In addition to sovereign rights, coastal States obtain jurisdiction over certain activities
on the continental shelf as well, such as laying pipelines輨輵 and the exclusive right to
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authorize and regulate drilling on the shelf for all purposes. 輨輶
Based on these articles, coastal States enjoy two distinct rights within their EEZs
and continental shelves: sovereign rights and jurisdiction. The former includes the
right to marine natural resources, whether living or non鄄living, and to renewable en鄄
ergy; the latter covers activities relevant to artificial islands, installations and struc鄄
tures, marine scientific research, marine environment, laying pipelines, and drill鄄
ing.
As mentioned above, States are highly constrained from fully exercising their na鄄
tional jurisdiction in disputed marine areas. 輨輷 Thus, the exercise of these rights will
be significantly affected in the disputed areas if the delimitation of the EEZ or conti鄄
nental shelf between States is pending. On the other hand, coastal States should en鄄
joy only those rights provided by UNCLOS. In other words, they should enjoy no
rights to address issues other than those provided for by UNCLOS. Thus, if provision鄄
al arrangements “shall冶 be made, the primary objective of these arrangements should
be facilitating the exercise of the rights provided by UNCLOS in the disputed areas
and on these rights only, unless other international conventions may apply in the dis鄄
puted areas as well (e. g., IMO shipping鄄related conventions).
This legal obligation applies to all bordering States / regions in the South China
Sea since they are all Contracting Parties to UNCLOS, except for China Taiwan.
Hence, each of them “shall冶 make every effort to reach provisional arrangements on
the subjects above in the disputed areas, which will be particularly impactful in the
Spratly Islands and surrounding waters.
吁. Potential Alternatives to the Disputes in the
South China Sea
摇 摇 Due to the probable difficulties in implementing either of the mechanisms dis鄄
cussed in the preceding section, alternatives which circumvent these sovereignty dis鄄
putes have been recommended by scholars and diplomats: “joint development冶 of oil
and gas reserves, and “regional cooperation冶 on the marine environment and shared
resources. These alternatives share an important feature: they prompt the parties con鄄
cerned to cooperate with each other on these respective issues without addressing the
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ternatives and discusses their concepts, key elements, existing practice, derived as鄄
sociated approaches, and chance of being accepted by parties involved in the South
China Sea in the near future.
A. Joint Development of Oil and Gas Reserves
The concept of joint development is of recent origin in international law, dating
from approximately the extension of maritime jurisdiction by coastal States during the
second half of the 1950s. 輩輮 Considering that final agreement on maritime delimitation
is not easy and may remain unsettled for years, exploitation and apportionment of
shared natural resources, particularly oil and gas reserves, has become a troublesome
problem because oil companies are unwilling to risk investing or entering exploration
contracts in disputed areas. As a consequence, “joint development is one of the ap鄄
proaches adopted by States in dealing with the challenge of resource exploitation in an
area subject to conflicting territorial claims, and its practice accelerated in 70s and
80s evidenced by the growing academic writings and State practice. 冶輩輯
1. Concept and Definition of “Joint Development冶
Despite decades of evolution, the concept of “ joint development冶 has not been
understood or used in a uniform way. Different definitions have been given by differ鄄
ent scholars / experts, such as “a decision by one or more countries to pool any rights
they may have over a given area and, to a greater or lesser degree, undertake some
form of joint management for the purposes of exploring and exploiting offshore miner鄄
als;冶輩輰“extending from the unitization of shared resources to the unilateral develop鄄
ment of a shared resource beyond a stipulated boundary, and various gradations in
between;冶輩輱“an intergovernmental arrangement of a provisional nature, designed for
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the functional purposes of joint exploration for and / or the exploitation of the hydrocar鄄
bon resources of the sea鄄bed beyond the territorial sea;冶輩輲 “ cooperation between
states based on agreement with regard to the exploration for and exploitation of certain
deposits, fields or accumulations of non鄄living resources which either extend across a
boundary or lie in an area of overlapping claims;冶輩輳 and “an agreement between two
states to develop so as to share jointly in agreed proportions by interstate cooperation
and national measures the offshore oil and gas in a designated zone of the sea鄄bed and
subsoil of the continental shelf to which both or either of the participating states are
entitled in international law. 冶輩輴 Therefore, Gao concluded that “there is no common鄄
ly accepted definition for joint development because those are in accordance with the
theoretical purpose of their study,冶輩輵 and “joint development remains in the process
of evolution, and the principle is still in a state of flux. 冶輩輶
2. Key Elements and Existing Practice
Several key elements of joint development can be concluded from these defini鄄
tions: it must be focused on shared non鄄living resources, particularly oil and gas re鄄
serves; formatted as an intergovernmental arrangement; and based on the spirit of
mutual cooperation. Djalal further considered that detailed elements in a joint devel鄄
opment activity include:
The area for joint development or joint cooperation should involve the relevant par鄄
ties;
The agreement to establish joint development or joint cooperation should be
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The participants should be those which are directly interested parties and
which are maintaining presence in the zone;
The subject should begin with the least controversial matters;
At a later stage, resources exploitation could be attempted; and
A specific period, say 40 or 50 years. 輩輷
According to the research of Churchill et al, Ong and other literature, a chrono鄄
logical but non鄄exhaustive list of State practice on the concept of joint development is
shown in Table 1.
Table 1摇 List of Existing State Practice on the Concept of Joint Development
Date Signed Treaty / Agreement / Memorandum of Understanding
22 February 1958
Agreement Concerning the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf in the
Persian Gulf Between the Shaykhdom of Bahrain and the Kingdom of Sa鄄
udi Arabia
23 January 1960
Agreement Between the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic and
the Austrian Federal Republic Concerning the Working of Common De鄄
posits of Natural Gas and Petroleum
14 May 1962
Supplementary Agreement to the Treaty Between the Kingdom of Nether鄄
lands and the Federal Republic of Germany Concerning Arrangements
for Co鄄operation in the Ems Estuary (Ems- Dollard Treaty 1960)
7 July 1965
Agreement Between the State of Kuwait and the Kingdom of Saudi Ara鄄
bia Relating to Partition of the Neutral Zone
20 March 1969
Agreement on the Settlement of Maritime Boundary Lines and Sovereign
Rights over Islands Between Qatar and Abu Dhabi
18 November 1971 Memorandum of Understanding Between Iran and Sharjah
29 January 1974
Supplement; Convention Between the Government of the French Repub鄄
lic and the Government of the Spanish State on the Delimitation of the
Continental Shelf of the Two States in the Bay of Biscay
5 February 1974
Agreement Between Japan and the Republic of [South] Korea Concern鄄
ing Joint Development of the Southern Part of the Continental Shelf Ad鄄
jacent to the Two Countries
16 May 1974
Agreement Between Sudan and Saudi Arabia Relating to the Joint Ex鄄
ploitation of the Natural Resources of the Sea鄄Bed and Sub鄄Soil of the
Red Sea in the Common Zone
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摇 (Continued from the previous page)
Date Signed Treaty / Agreement / Memorandum of Understanding
10 May 1976
Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Kingdom of Nor鄄
way Relating to the Exploitation of the Frigg Field Reservoir and the
Transmission of Gas Therefrom to the United Kingdom
21 February 1979
Memorandum of Understanding between Malaysia and the Kingdom of
Thailand on the Establishment of a Joint Authority for the Exploitation of
the Resources in the Sea鄄Bed in a Defined Area of the Continental Shelf
of the Two Countries in the Gulf of Thailand
22 October 1981 Agreement on the Continental Shelf Between Iceland and Norway
19 November 1988
Agreement for the Exploitation of ( and Investment in) the Joint Area
Between the Two Sectors of Yemen- the Yemen Arab Republic and the
People蒺s Democratic Republic of Yemen
11 December 1989
Treaty Between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia on the Zone of
Co鄄operation in an Area Between the Indonesian Province of East Timor
and North Australia
30 May 1990
Agreement Between the Government of Malaysia and the Government of
the Kingdom of Thailand on the Constitution and Other Matters Relating
to the Establishment of the Malaysia鄄Thailand Joint Authority
5 June 1992
Memorandum of Understanding Between Malaysia and Vietnam for the
Exploration and Exploitation of Petroleum in the Gulf of Thailand
12 November 1993
Maritime Delimitation Treaty Between Jamaica and the Republic of Co鄄
lombia
14 October 1993
Management and Co鄄operation Agreement Between the Government of
the Republic of Senegal and the Government of the Republic of Guinea鄄
Bissau
27 September 1995
Joint Declaration of Argentina and the United Kingdom on Co鄄operation
over Offshore Activities in the South West Atlantic
5 July 2001 Memorandum of Understanding of Timor Sea Arrangement
摇 摇 (Sources: David M. Ong, The 1979 and 1990 Malaysia鄄Thailand Joint Development Agree鄄
ments: A Model for International Legal Co鄄operation in Common Offshore Petroleum Deposits?, The
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1999, pp. 211 ~ 212; Robin
R. Churchill et al, New Directions in the Law of the Sea, Vol. I ~ XI, New York: Oceana Publica鄄
tions, 1973 - 1981; Jonathan I. Charney and Lewis M. Alexander eds., International Maritime
Boundaries, Vol. I, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993; Robin R. Churchill, Falkland
Islands鄄Maritime Jurisdiction and Co鄄operative Arrangements with Argentina, International and Cor鄄
raparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 46, 1997, pp. 463 ~ 477. )
872
Based on these State practices, Miyoshi concluded that there are three broad
types of joint development schemes: (1) A joint development scheme devised with
the maritime boundary delimited; (2) A program of joint development worked out for
the purpose of utilizing hydrocarbon deposits which straddle the boundary line; and
(3) A joint development scheme worked out with the issue of boundary delimitation
shelved or kept unresolved (perhaps the most complicated type). 輪輮
3. Joint Development as an Alternative in the South China Sea
Many scholars have recommended joint development of oil and gas reserves as an
alternative to the sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea. For example, Djalal
suggested that joint development “ is a mechanism to achieve a provisional measure
pending the solution of a maritime boundary dispute,冶輪輯 and “is useful and promising
in South East Asia and in the South China Sea. 冶輪輰 Ji also considered that “joint de鄄
velopment of resources could be taken as a transitional measure towards the final set鄄
tlement [of maritime delimitations]. 冶輪輱 Zou concluded that joint development would
provide “a good environment for their social and economic development;冶 is “an ef鄄
fective and rational use of South China Sea resources,冶 can “serve as a prerequisite
to peacefully resolving the South China Sea disputes,冶 and can “enhance and expand
regional cooperation in other areas. 冶輪輲
In addition, Gao mentioned that “joint development, as an interim measure, is
certainly not the optimal solution to the problem of territorial dispute, but it might be
in some cases the only alternative to no action or confrontation. In short, it is a politi鄄
cally feasible, practically useful and legally sound concept. 冶輪輳 Shibata and Onorato
concluded that “ joint development without previously agreed partition of a resource
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area between claimant States is both feasible and mutually advantageous to the States
involved. Experience shows that the success of such a form of cooperation is itself
conducive to the future settlement of conflicting territorial claims and to broader coop鄄
eration among the States involved. 冶輪輴 Valencia observed that “joint development is a
useful concept which has applicability as pressure mounts to develop oil and mineral
resources in areas of jurisdictional overlap. 冶輪輵 Smith commented that “the creation of
joint development zones ( JDZs) has provided a good mechanism for neighboring
States to put aside contentious boundary issues and to get on with the activity of see鄄
king and recovering offshore resources. 冶輪輶
Finally, the Timor Gap dispute differed from the Spratly Islands dispute in that
no islands were involved, there had not been a history of armed conflict, and regional
security was not an issue. Despite these differences, Mito recommended that “the Ti鄄
mor Gap Treaty could nonetheless serve as a workable model and source of ideas and
principles for a solution to the Spratly Islands dispute. 冶輪輷 He also concluded that
“scholars and commentators have proposed countless solutions and suggestions to re鄄
solve the impasse in the South China Sea. Joint development, however, is the most
appealing and promising solution. 冶輫輮
Like diplomatic negotiation and third鄄party arbitration, however, no successful
joint development cases have been concluded in the South China Sea yet. As a highly
recommended alternative, why is the concept of joint development so difficult to apply
in the region? Djalal provided possible reasons for failure of agreement efforts on joint
development:
1. It is difficult to know which areas are being claimed by certain countries, and
therefore it is difficult to clearly define the disputed area;
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3. Many claimants do not seem to take the provisions of semi鄄enclosed seas in
Articles 122 and 123 seriously, particularly the provision that stipulate cooperation
in the SESs;
4. The concept of joint development at this moment seems to mean different
things to different people. Joint development should not be attempted in an area
which a claimant believes to be its own, and that the concept should only be used
in an area claimed by others or for an area outside of its claims. 輫輯
Another likely explanation is that the concept of joint development of oil and gas
reserves requires that the States concerned first decide how to “ fairly冶 allocate the
benefits and costs of such development. However, the percentage of allocated bene鄄
fits and costs for each State could additionally be interpreted to reflect the strength of
that State蒺s sovereignty over the joint development area. Therefore, to determine such
percentages means that States have to resolve effectively their sovereignty disputes on
continental shelves first.
Based on the analysis above, it is reasonable to anticipate that joint development
of oil and gas reserves will not likely work in the near future because it suffers the
same weakness as traditional mechanisms: sovereignty disputes in the South China
Sea must be resolved before meaningful actions can be taken.
B. Regional Cooperation on the Marine Environment
and Shared Resources
摇 摇 The importance of regional cooperation to the study and practice of international
ocean management is well established. Innumerable studies have focused on the re鄄
gional level of every conceivable ocean resource and use, and the emergence of nu鄄
merous regional arrangements and institutions addressing all aspects of ocean manage鄄
ment has been well documented. 輫輰 As a result, regional cooperation has recently
been recommended by some scholars as an alternative to circumvent the dispute stale鄄
mate in the South China Sea.
The basic concept of regional cooperation is similar to that of joint development,
which is also based on the spirit of mutual cooperation among States, but the subjects
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addressed by these two alternatives are different. Joint development primarily focuses
on non鄄renewable oil and gas reserves within the continental shelves. In contrast, re鄄
gional cooperation traditionally addresses the marine environment and shared re鄄
sources, or “commons,冶 particularly renewable ones.
1. Definition of Commons
In general, “ commons,冶 or “ common鄄pool resources冶 (CPRs), are the ele鄄
ments of the environment ( tangible resources or intangible assets) that are shared,
used and enjoyed by a community. 輫輱 Within the field of international environmental
law, there are various definitions to “commons冶 delimiting and describing the scope
and elements contained, thus the list of “commons冶 is both long and diverse. For ex鄄
ample, Ostrom stated that “CPRs have traditionally included terrestrial and marine e鄄
cosystems that are simultaneously viewed as depletable and renewable. Characteristic
of many resources is that use by one reduces the quantity or quality available to oth鄄
ers, and that use by others adds negative attributes to a resource. 冶輫輲 Oakerson con鄄
sidered that commons can have a fixed location like a woodlot, can occur as a “fugi鄄
tive冶 resource such as fish and wildlife, or may be indivisible over large areas such
as oceans and the atmosphere. 輫輳 In addition to the elements of the natural environ鄄
ment, commons can also refer to the cultural sphere, such as literature, information,
software, sites of heritage, as well as products of civilization like irrigation systems or
the World Wide Web. 輫輴
For the purpose of this article, “commons冶 is defined as the marine environment
and natural living resources (particularly fisheries resources) which are shared, used
and enjoyed by all parties in the South China Sea. Non鄄living and non鄄renewable re鄄
sources such as oil and gas reserves which are primarily addressed using joint devel鄄
opment are not included as commons for this discussion, except as they relate to pro鄄






Ronald J. Oakerson, Analyzing the Commons: A framework, in Daniel W. Bromley ed., Mak鄄
ing the Commons Work: Theory, Practice, and Policy, San Francisco: Institute for Contempo鄄
rary Studies, 1992, p. 41.
Elinor Ostrom, Joanna Burger, Christopher B. Field, Richard B. Norgaard and David Polican鄄
sky, Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges, Science, Vol. 284, No.
5412, 1999, p. 279.
Ronald J. Oakerson, Analyzing the Commons: A framework, in Daniel W. Bromley ed., Mak鄄
ing the Commons Work: Theory, Practice, and Policy, San Francisco: Institute for Contempo鄄
rary Studies, 1992, p. 41.
Elinor Ostrom, Joanna Burger, Christopher B. Field, Richard B. Norgaard and David Polican鄄
sky, Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges, Science, Vol. 284, No.
5412, 1999, p. 279.
environmental accidents.
The South China Sea not only is rich in fisheries resources but also contains im鄄
portant ecosystems. For instance, there are important areas of coral reefs, man鄄
groves, extensive seagrass beds, and other critical habitats for many species in the
region. However, such great natural wealth is now being adversely affected by in鄄
creasing marine uses, human populations and economic activities, particularly human
settlement in coastal areas. According to Chircop, 70 percent of the mangroves have
been destroyed or damaged, and 20 percent to 50 percent of seagrass beds have been
damaged. As elsewhere in the world, overfishing is a major cause of environmental
degradation in this region, and many migratory species are affected by overexploitati鄄
on, land鄄based activities, pollution and loss of habitats. 輫輵 Many of these resources
and habitats lie in disputed areas. Thus, to prevent these valuable living resources
and habitats from further damage, protection and management of commons in the
South China Sea must be addressed cooperatively among bordering States / regions as
soon as possible.
2. Cooperation in International Law 輫輶
Cooperation among States developed under the framework of international law af鄄
ter World War II. Since then, as global interconnectedness and international trade
have increased, and awareness of international issues such as transboundary pollution
has improved, States have become more willing to engage in cooperative activities.
This is evidenced by the adoption of a large number of multilateral instruments and
the establishment of numerous international organizations.
Requirements of cooperation can be found in many legally鄄binding conventions
such as the Charter of the United Nations輫輷 and UNCLOS, as well as non鄄binding de鄄
clarations such as the 1970 Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co鄄operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of
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the United Nations輬輮 and the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Develop鄄
ment. 輬輯 In addition, international cooperation has been associated with formal or in鄄
stitutionalized patterns of cooperation in the field of international relations, particular鄄
ly within the distinct subfield of international organizations. Inquiry has focused on
formal institutional structures such as the United Nations and how international organ鄄
izations can facilitate international cooperation. 輬輰 Based on these references, coopera鄄
tion among States has been enshrined in these international legal instruments and the
practices of international organizations, and has become a fundamental principle in
both fields.
Cooperation can be enshrined in either “ hard law冶 or “ soft law. 冶 With hard
law, cooperation is established and regulated by a legally鄄binding instrument, usually
entitled a Convention, Protocol or Agreement. States are bound to cooperate with oth鄄
er parties and comply with the regulations stipulated in the instrument. In contrast,
with soft law, cooperation arises from a non鄄binding instrument, which relies on “in鄄
ternational norms that are deliberately non鄄binding in character but still have legal
relevance, located in the twilight between law and politics,冶輬輱 usually entitled Decla鄄
ration, Code of Conduct, or Plan of Action. Without compulsory requirements,
States involved cooperate in a voluntary spirit and address the subjects called upon in
the instrument based on their goodwill.
Advantages and disadvantages exist in both forms. Hard law provides a powerful
framework, reduces transaction costs, strengthens the credibility of States蒺 commit鄄
ments, expands their available political strategies, and resolves problems of incom鄄
plete contracting. 輬輲 However, it also entails significant costs because reaching agree鄄
ments among parties is difficult and slow. In contrast, criticisms of soft law include
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instrument that can no longer serve its purpose冶輬輳 and that it is only an interim step
toward harder and therefore more satisfactory legalization. 輬輴 Despite these criticisms,
soft law is often deliberately favored by international actors because it offers many ad鄄
vantages that hard law does not. Soft law offers a more flexible and expedient way to
address urgent issues, is easier to agree upon than hard law, and proposes a more ef鄄
fective way to address uncertainty and facilitate compromise, particularly “ between
actors with different interests and values, different time horizons and discount rates,
and different degrees of power. 冶輬輵
As mentioned above, cooperation has been widely applied in ocean manage鄄
ment, particularly on regional seas marine environmental protection and shared living
resources, or “commons. 冶 Although a global approach has been popular for ocean
management due to the global scale of many challenges, the need for some degree of
consistency of principle, and the transboundary nature of ocean issues (e. g., ship鄄
ping, fish, and pollution), States found that “not all of these are functionally man鄄
ageable at a global level. 冶輬輶 In addition, regional approaches contain a smaller num鄄
ber of States with more congruent interests and similar management concerns. As a
consequence, a regional approach may have a better chance of achieving more specif鄄
ic objectives, with more strongly binding requirements, than could be reached within
a larger group. 輬輷 The United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) Regional
Seas Programmes (RSPs) and Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RF鄄
MOs) are good examples of the effectiveness of the regional approach.
As mentioned earlier in this article, the nature wealth of the South China Sea is
now being adversely affected by human activities and natural climate change. Thus,
cooperation among these States at regional level is urgent and necessary to prevent
these valuable living resources and habitats from further damage.
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3. Regional Cooperation as an Alternative in the South China Sea
Similar to joint development, regional cooperation is another measure adopted by
States concerned to circumvent sovereignty disputes, such as in the Arctic and Ant鄄
arctic regions. 輭輮 Particularly, there is no lack of legal commitments for the bordering
States / regions to cooperate with each other, especially on ocean鄄related issues such
as marine environmental protection. 輭輯
Since UNCLOS has been recognized as a (constitutive) regime by the interna鄄
tional community in ocean鄄related issues, the process of cooperation among States
found within its articles should be applicable to all parties as well. First, the cooper鄄
ation mechanism within an enclosed or semi鄄enclosed sea envisaged in Part IX should
be applied in the South China Sea. Article 123 states that States bordering an en鄄
closed or semi鄄enclosed sea “should cooperate with each other in the exercise of their
rights and in the performance of their duties under this Convention冶 in the field of
marine living resources, marine environment and marine scientific research. Mean鄄
while, Article 197 also stipulates that “States shall cooperate on a global basis and,
as appropriate, on a regional basis … for the protection and preservation of the ma鄄
rine environment …冶
In addition to UNCLOS, other international conventions create legally鄄binding
environmental obligations for States who are parties. These conventions include, inter
alia, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD),輭輰 the Convention on Wetlands
of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitation ( Ramsar Conven鄄
tion),輭輱 the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural
Heritage (World Heritage Convention),輭輲 the Convention on International Trade in
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Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS). 輭輴 As of 2012, most bor鄄
dering States / regions in the South China Sea are Contracting Parties to these conven鄄
tions, meaning that they have legal obligations to observe and implement the regula鄄
tions under them. 輭輵
As evidenced in many regional conventions, the concept of regional cooperation
and its application is not new. However, taking this concept as a means to circum鄄
vent sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea has only been proposed by scholars
within the last decade. For example, Chircop emphasized that the coastal inhabit鄄
ants, ecosystems, and economies in the South China Sea would experience significant
harm due to climate and ecological change. He also concluded that no bordering State
could effectively respond to this change alone even within its own undisputed jurisdic鄄
tion. 輭輶 Accordingly, he made suggestions as follows:
The urgency of accelerating marine conservation in the SCS can hardly be oversta鄄
ted. The ecological and economic losses sustained to date are likely to worsen …
By cooperating through an ambitious MPA network program, the states will be
acting in their own individual and collective long鄄term interests to adapt their cli鄄
mate change impacts from weakened marine and coastal ecosystem and protect
their coastal communities …輭輷
MacManus et al observed that cooperative activities in the field of marine scien鄄
tific research, environmental protection and defense are regularly carried out on bilat鄄
eral or multilateral bases in the South China Sea. Thus, he proposed to establish a
Marine Protected Area (MPA) in the South China Sea. This MPA, entitled “ the
Spratly Island Marine Peace Park,冶 would cover the Spratly Islands and its surround鄄
ing waters. The rationale for his proposal is that these areas host a great diversity of
marine species, provide critical habitats for endangered species, and are important
nursery grounds for marine larvae to restore fish stocks depleted by overfishing and
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the degradation of marine ecosystem in the region. 骳髄髒
This proposition, however, encountered some challenges. Hu pointed out that
although establishing an MPA within undisputed marine areas usually does not require
the cooperation of other countries, establishing an MPA within disputed waters needs
the political will and the policy input of all countries concerned. Thus, the process of
reaching consensus among claimant States to make the entire Spratly area a marine
park could be troublesome, particularly given the strategic military concerns and
strong interests expressed by many States in oil and gas reserves within the area. 骳髄體
Nevertheless, MacManus et al argued that there is little evidence for the existence of
substantial and economically extractable oil in the region. Without profits from oil,
any military efforts to defend oil claims could result in unacceptably high military ma鄄
intenance cost for claimant States / regions. Therefore, “the feasibility of establishing
a Marine Peace Park could thus be enhanced. 冶骳髄髕
4. Summary
Cooperation has been recognized as a necessary and fundamental principle in in鄄
ternational law and international relations. Regional cooperation as an alternative to
circumvent sovereignty disputes has been implemented in other regions for years, but
has only recently been proposed as an alternative in the South China Sea. In addi鄄
tion, there already exist many legal commitments by bordering States / regions to coop鄄
erate on the commons under UNCLOS and many other international environmental
conventions. As a matter of fact, some cooperative activities related to the commons
are regularly carried out on bilateral or multilateral bases in the region. Notwithstand鄄
ing the lack of progress toward final settlement of sovereignty disputes, regional coop鄄
eration on commons issues in the South China Sea may be a workable alternative for
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遇. Conclusion
Collectively the sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea give rise to one of
the most intractable regional conflicts in the world. A review of the background and
status quo in the South China Sea reveals that sovereignty disputes in the region are
unlikely to be settled in the foreseeable future, because no claimant is likely to make
any concessions or compromises regarding its claims.
Despite being recommended by scholars and diplomats for decades, traditional
mechanisms of dispute settlement such as diplomatic negotiation and third鄄party arbi鄄
tration will not likely work in the near future in the South China Sea. It is expected
that the current stalemate will continue, but this does not mean that the States / re鄄
gions involved should take no actions. Indeed under UNCLOS, all claimant States /
regions are obligated to make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements relat鄄
ed to natural resources and jurisdiction over certain activities while the delimitation of
the EEZ or continental shelf is pending. The keyword for these efforts is “ coopera鄄
tion. 冶
Joint development of oil and gas reserves and regional cooperation on the com鄄
mons are two alternatives suggested by scholars and diplomats to avoid the current
dispute stalemate in the South China Sea, yet advance the environmental and eco鄄
nomic interests of the region. In fact, both alternatives could be treated as provisional
arrangements described in Article 74(3) and 83(3) of UNCLOS, because of their
shared focus on natural resources. However, joint development of oil and gas re鄄
serves, like traditional mechanisms, has not yet been accepted or implemented in the
South China Sea because it is subject to the same obstacle as traditional mechanisms.
Cooperation could be used to effectively solve cross鄄border commons issues, and
thus may be expected to substantially ameliorate the degradation of the marine envi鄄
ronment, restore the depleting living resources and important habitats, enhance ma鄄
rine scientific knowledge, improve the exchange of necessary information, assist ca鄄
pacity鄄building of all parties, etc. It is further anticipated that such cooperation could
provide a channel of dialogue among parties concerned in the South China Sea to im鄄
prove mutual trust and understanding, provide opportunity for States to experience
working with one another, and promote stronger partnerships in this region, all of
which might reasonably be expected to reduce political tension, foster a better politi鄄
cal atmosphere, and eventually lead to more substantial discussions over the sover鄄
eignty disputes in the more distant future. In fact, some regional efforts related to
marine scientific research and environmental protection have occurred or are currently
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being undertaken on either a bilateral or multilateral basis in the region, notwith鄄
standing the lack of progress toward final settlement of sovereignty disputes. These in鄄
clude the East Asia Seas (EAS) Regional Sea Programme (RSP) of the United Na鄄
tions Environmental Programme (UNEP), the Partnerships in Environmental Man鄄
agement for the Seas of East Asia (PEMSEA), and the UNEP / Global Environment
Facility (GEF) South China Sea Project. 骳髄髖 Thus, regional cooperation, particularly
on the commons, may be the only alternative that could work as a provisional ar鄄
rangement in the South China Sea in the near future.
As always, the political will of all parties is paramount to the success of such an
endeavor. If the parties in the South China Sea look beyond issues of sovereignty to
the potential advantages of regional cooperation, particularly in commons issues where
sovereignty disputes are not front and center and can be laid aside, there is a strong
likelihood that they can muster the political will necessary to advance regional cooper鄄
ation.
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